We consider an equilibrium model of the Limit Order Book in a stock market, where a large number of competing agents post "buy" or "sell" orders. For the "one-shot" game, it is shown that the two sides of the LOB are determined by the distribution of the random size of the incoming order, and by the maximum price accepted by external buyers (or the minimum price accepted by external sellers). We then consider an iterated game, where more agents come to the market, posting both market orders and limit orders. Equilibrium strategies are found by backward induction, in terms of a value function which depends on the current sizes of the two portions of the LOB. The existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is proved under a natural assumption, namely: the probability that the external order is so large that it wipes out the entire LOB should be sufficiently small.
A detailed description the evolution model for the two-sided LOB is given in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we derive conditions for the existence of a unique shape for the evolution of the two-sided LOB, together with a priori bounds on the value functions V C i , V S i .
The present models are meant to capture some features of the Limit Order Book. In particular: (i) its shape, depending on the distribution of the random external orders, (ii) the expected profit achieved by agents posting limit orders, depending on the total size of the LOB, and hence on the competition among these agents. On the other hand, in our present model the incoming orders are regarded as independent random variables, which do not carry information about the fundamental value of the stock. The issue of how to extract information from the size and frequency of incoming orders will be a topic for a future work.
There is a large and growing literature modeling different aspects of the Limit Order Book [2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19] . In particular, the spreading of information and the price impact and of a large external order have been studied in [1, 3, 4] . For a survey, we refer to [14] or [17] .
The two-sided LOB for the one-shot game
We consider a continuum model of the Limit Order Book, described by a density function φ = φ(s), as in Fig. 1 , right. Calling p 0 the "fundamental value" of the stock, known to all agents posting bids on the LOB, the function φ will describe sell orders posted on the LOB for prices p > p 0 , and buy orders for p < p 0 . In other words, for p 0 < p 1 < p 2 , the integral gives the total amount of stock that the agents offer for sale at price p ∈ [p 1 , p 2 ]. On the other hand, for p 1 < p 2 < p 0 , the integral (2.1) gives the total amount of stock that the agents are willing to buy at price p ∈ [p 1 , p 2 ]. The minimum ask price (i.e., the lowest price at which some agent offers to sell stock) is denoted by
while the maximum bid price (i.e., the highest price at which some agent offers to buy stock) is denoted by
Throughout the following, we denote the mean bid-ask price as
In a basic model, one can assume that the maximum price that an external buyer is willing to pay (or the minimum price that an external seller is willing to accept) is a given multiple of the mean price p. In this case, external agents will buy stock only at a price p ≤ (1 + δ)p. Right: a possible shape of the limit order book. If the external order is a buy order with size X > 0 , all the stocks in the shaded region on the right (with area = X), will be sold. If the external order is a sell order for an amount Y > 0 of stocks, all the buy orders in the shaded region on the left (with area = Y ), will be executed.
Similarly, an external agent will agree to sell his stock only at a price p ≥ (1 − δ)p. Here δ > 0 is a small constant, given a priori.
A more general assumption, considered in [8] for a one-side LOB, is that the maximum price acceptable to external agents is random. We assume here that an external buyer will agree to the transaction only at a price p ≤ Q b · p, where Q b ≥ 1 is a random variable. Similarly, an external seller will agree to the transaction only at a price p ≥ Q s · p, where Q s is another random variable, ranging in [0, 1].
In general, an external order is thus executed as follows ( Fig. 1, right) .
CASE 1: a buy order of size X. In this case the external buyer will take all stocks whose price ranges in the interval [p 0 , p(X)], where
CASE 2: a sell order of size Y . In this case the external seller will fulfill all the bids whose price ranges in the interval [p(Y ), p 0 ], where
Assume that, after the external order has been executed, the payoff for any player holding an amount c in cash and s in stock is given by
The following analysis will show that, given the distribution of the random variables X, Y , the shape of the limit order book is entirely determined by p 0 and the quantities
respectively the total amount of stock in the "sell" and in the "buy" portion of the LOB.
The heart of the argument goes as follows. First, for a given mean price p, we show that the both the "sell" and the "buy" portions of the LOB are uniquely determined. In particular, the minimum ask price p A and the maximum bid price p B are uniquely determined as functions of p. In the case where 1 2
is a strict contraction, hence it has a unique fixed point. This will provide the unique shape of the LOB.
For sake of clarity, we first study the case where the maximum price accepted by external buyers and the minimum price accepted by external sellers are
respectively, for some δ 1 , δ 2 > 0. Afterwards, we shall consider the general case where these prices are random.
(I) -Computing the "sell" portion of the LOB.
In the case of a buy order with random size X, let
Prob. X > s = Ψ(s), s ≥ 0, (2.9) be the distribution of this random variable, and assume By (2.9), the probability that a stock offered at price p ≤ (1 + δ 1 )p will be sold is
The assumption that the LOB represent an equilibrium implies that the expected profit from a unit amount of stock put on sale is a constant. On the support of U (i.e. on the set of prices at which some stock is offered for sale), by (2.5) and (2.12) it follows
for some constant C independent of p. Differentiating (2.13) w.r.t. p we obtain an ODE for U , namely
Observe that by (A1) we have Ψ < 0. hence the right hand side of (2.14) is non-negative for p > p 0 .
As in (2.6), letx be the total amount of stock offered for sale in the LOB. Then the ODE (3.8) should be solved with the terminal condition
and, according to (2.11) , the function U is absolutely continuous, we have U (p A ) = 0 and Ψ(U (p A )) = 1. Hence, the constant C in (2.13) can be computed equivalently as
(II) -Computing the "buy" portion of the LOB.
Next, consider the "buy" portion of the LOB. In the case of an external sell order of random size Y , let the distribution of this random variable be
We assume that the map s → Φ(s) satisfies the same conditions as in (A1). Given a mean bid-ask price p, the external agent will agree to the transaction only as long as the price ranges within an interval [(1 − δ 2 )p, p].
In analogy with (2.11), for p < p 0 we call U (p) . = p 0 p φ(s) ds = [amount of stock that agents bid to buy at price ≥ p].
(2.21)
The expected profit from a unit amount of cash, bidding at price p, is
Since the expected profit in (2.22) is constant over the support of U , we have 
.
Notice that here the right hand side is negative, because p < p 0 while Φ < 0 < Φ. This is consistent with the definition (2.21).
Callingȳ the total amount of stock for which agents post buying bids, the above ODE must be solved with the boundary condition
Then the constant C in (2.23) can be equivalently computed as
This yields
The previous analysis leads to Theorem 1. Assume that the random sizes X, Y of an external "buy" and a "sell" order have distributions given by (2.9), (2.20), respectively, and satisfy the assumptions (A1). Moreover, assume that the external agent will agree to the transaction if the price is ≤ (1 + δ 1 )p in case of a buyer, and ≥ (1 − δ 2 )p in case of a seller, where p is the mean bid-ask price.
Letx,ȳ be the total amount of stock for which selling bids and buying bids are posted on the LOB, respectively. Assume that
Then there exists a unique two-sided LOB satisfying (2.14) and (2.24).
Proof. 1. By the previous analysis, both sides of the LOB are uniquely determined as soon as the mean bid-ask price p is given, specifying that no sell order (resp. buy order) is posted in the LOB when (1 + δ 1 )p < p 0 (resp. p 0 < (1 − δ 2 )p). Recalling (2.18), (2.28), we set
The theorem can thus be proved by showing that the continuous map
has a unique fixed point.
2.
We claim that the function F in (2.31) maps the interval 
By continuity, F has a fixed point. 
This proves that F is a strict contraction, having a unique fixed point p = p A +p B 2 . Remark 1. In the above theorem, Ψ(x) is the probability that an external buy order is so large that the entire "sell" portion of the LOB is wiped out, while Φ(ȳ) is the probability that the external sell order is so large that the entire "buy" portion of the LOB is wiped out. In essence, the assumption (2.30) requires that the sizesx,ȳ of the LOB are large enough, compared with the random sizes of external orders.
Example 1.
In the case where the random incoming orders X, Y have exponential distribution, say Ψ(s) = e −γs , Φ(s) = e −βs , the equations determining the shape of the LOB take a particularly simple form. Indeed, the ODE (2.14) determining the "sell" part of the LOB becomes
On the other hand, the ODE (2.24) determining the "buy" part of the LOB becomes
. Letx,ȳ be the total amounts of stock on the "sell" and "buy" portions of the LOB, and let δ 1 , δ 2 be given, as in (2.8).
The density function φ in (2.1), describing the two sides of the LOB, is here determined by
The constantsp, p A , p B are implicitly determined by the three equations
(2.38) 
The two-sided LOB with random acceptable prices
We now consider the more general case where the maximum price Q b · p acceptable to a buyer and the minimum price Q s · p acceptable to a seller are random variables.
For example, one could let Q b be a random variable such that
Here h(·) is a continuous map, twice continuously differentiable on the open interval s ∈ ]1, 1 + δ 1 [ for some δ 1 ∈ ]0, 1[, which satisfies
In the following, we always assume that, after the external order has been executed, the payoff of any agent holding an amount c in cash and s in stock is given by (2.5).
(I) The "sell" portion of the LOB, with random acceptable prices.
As in (2.11), let U (p) be the total amount of stock offered for sale at price ≤ p. Assume that the maximum price accepted by an external buyer is Q b p, where Q b is the random variable in (3.1). Moreover, assume that
5)
where γ > 1 is defined by
The expected payoff for a seller asking a price p is
The assumption that the LOB represents an equilibrium implies that C is a constant independent of p. Differentiating (3.7) we thus obtain
Throughout the following we use the notation
Let p be given. For any p ∈ p 0 ∨ p ,
If p ≤ p 0 , then Λ(p 0 +) = + ∞. Moreover, by (3.2)-(3.3) and Gronwall's inequality it follows
By continuity and monotonicity, there exists a unique p ∈ p 0 ∨ p , (1 + δ 1 )p such that Λ(p ) = 0. It satisfies Λ(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p ∈ p 0 , p . 
wherex is the total amount of stocks offered for sale on the LOB. Call
the minimum ask price. This implies U (p A ) = 0 and hence Ψ(U (p A )) = 1. The constant C in (3.7) can be computed by taking p = p A , so that
Proof. For any fixed p, we have
Differentiating (3.15) w.r.t. p and recalling that Λ(p ) = 0, we obtain
The assumptions (3.2), (3.3) and the identity (3.16) imply that 0 < d dp p A . Moreover
By (3.19 ) and the assumption (3.14) we obtain 
However, notice that we cannot have d dp p A < 1 if δ 1 > 1 and the total amountx of stock put on sale on the LOB is very small.
On the other hand, for any 0 < δ 1 ≤ µ, all the assumptions in Lemma 1 are satisfied by taking
(3.21) (II) The "buy" portion of the LOB, with random acceptable prices.
Given a mean bid-ask price p, we assume that the external agent will agree to the transaction only as long as the price ranges within an interval
and assume that the map g(·) is continuous, C 2 on some interval ]1 − δ 2 , 1[, with 0 < δ 2 < 1/3, and satisfies
Furthermore, we assume that p is such that
where σ > 2 is defined by
In particular, we have
As in (2.21), we denote by U (p) the total amount of stock that agents are offering to buy at price > p.
The expected profit from a unit amount of cash bidding at a price p is
Since the expected profit in (3.28) is constant over the support of U , we have 
Observe that, under the assumptions (3.24) and (3.27), the map p → Λ(p) is strictly increasing. If p < p 0 , by (3.25) and (3.26) we have
If p ≥ p 0 , then Λ(p 0 −) = +∞. Moreover, observe that (3.23)-(3.24) and Gronwall's lemma imply that lim s→(1−δ 2 )+ g (s)
By continuity and monotonicity, there exists a unique p ∈ (1 − δ 2 )p, p 0 ∧ p such that Λ(p ) = 0. One has Λ(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p ∈ p , p 0 . the maximum bid price. By (A1), we have that U (p B ) = 0. In this setting, the expected profit in (3.29) from a unit amount of cash can be computed by taking p = p B , namely
Lemma 2. Assume that the function g in (3.22) satisfies
Then 0 < d dp p B < 1.
Proof. For any p, we have
Differentiating (3.37) w.r.t. p and recalling that Λ(p ) = 0, we obtain
The second inequality in (3.36) and (3.38) imply 0 < d dp p B . Moreover,
and by (3.27), one has
(3.41)
The inequality (3.41) and the assumption (3.36) yield
for every p ∈ ]p , p B [. Therefore, by (3.39) and (3.42) we have d dp p B < 1. Example 3. Consider a random variable Q s which is uniformly distributed over the interval [1 − δ 2 , 1], so that g is given by
(3.43)
Then the condition (3.36) is satisfied.
Based on the previous analysis, we can now prove Theorem 2. Assume that the random sizes X, Y of an external "buy" and a "sell" order have distributions given by (2.9), (2.20), respectively, and satisfy the assumptions (A1). Moreover, assume that the external agent will agree to the transaction if the price is ≤ Q b p in case of a buyer, and ≥ Q s p in case of a seller, where p is the mean bid-ask price, Q b is a random variable in Then for any given sizesx,ȳ > 0 of the "sell" and of the "buy" portions of the LOB, the mean bid-ask price p and the two-sided LOB are uniquely determined.
Proof. 1. For any choice of the mean price p, the minimum ask price p A and the maximum bid price p B are uniquely determined by solving the Cauchy problem (3.8), (3.11) , and the Cauchy problem (3.30), (3.33), respectively.
Let γ and σ as in (3.6) and (3.26 ). Consider the interval
and define the mapp
where p A and p B were defined at (3.12) and (3.34), respectively. The proof will be achieved by showing that F maps I into itself and has a unique fixed point.
If
As in (3.10), here p = p (p) is the unique point where the map p → Λ(p) in (3.9) vanishes. By (3.3) we have
This yields
. 
As in (3.32), let p = p (p) be the point where the function Λ in (3.31) vanishes. Since d dp p > 0, it will be sufficient to check that
in the case where p < p 0 .
By (3.24), we have
Moreover, by (3.50), (3.27 ) and the definition of p , we obtain 
In the remaining case where g (1−) < 2(1−δ 2 ) 1−2δ 2 , one has σ = 2(1−δ 2 ) 1−2δ 2 and
4.
By the previous two steps, F maps the closed interval I in (3.44) into itself. Hence it has a fixed point. By Lemmas 1 and 2 we have 0 < d dp F (p) < 1. Hence the map F is a strict contraction, with a unique fixed point.
The dynamic model
We now consider a repeated game, including a sequence of N random incoming orders X 1 , . . ., X N . Assume that the X i are independent, identically distributed random variables. In addition, at each time t i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, agents can post on the LOB new sell or buy orders.
is the mean bid-ask price, we assume that external buyers and external sellers will agree to the transaction if the price is ≤ (1 + δ 1 )p, and ≥ (1 − δ 2 )p, respectively.
The state variable. At each time t i , the state is described by two positive variables: (x i , y i ), where • x i is the total amount of stock in the "sell" portion of the LOB, at time t i ,
• y i is the total amount of stock in the "buy" portion of the LOB, at time t i .
The evolution equation. At each time t i , an external buy order of random size X i , or a sell order of size Y i will arrive. After this order is executed, the corresponding part of the LOB shrinks in size, while the other portion remains unchanged. More precisely, using the notation a + . = max{a, 0}, the new sizes are
in case of a buy order or a sell order, respectively.
To account for the fact that agents can post new sell or buy orders on the LOB (or remove some of the old ones), we consider a transition probability density f (x, y;x,ỹ). Here
If one assumes that limit orders are never removed (unless they are executed), then one has the implication x <x or y <ỹ =⇒ f (x, y;x,ỹ) = 0.
Let P s ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that at time t i a "sell" order arrives, and let P b = 1 − P s be the probability that at time t i a "buy" order arrives. Here P s and P b are fixed constants. Then the sizes of the "buy" and "sell" portions of the LOB are described by a Markov process.
The value functions. Consider any point (x, y) in state space. For any i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we denote by
the maximum expected payoffs that an agent can achieve at the terminal time t N , provided that at time t i
• the two portions of the LOB have sizes x, y, and
• the agent owns a unit of cash, or a unit of stock, respectively
We wish to describe the evolution of the LOB, in terms of the following data:
• The random variables X, Y , describing the size of the external (buy or sell) orders.
• The transition probability density f (·, ·; x, y), describing the new limit orders posted in the LOB.
• The terminal valueβ of a unit of stock.
This should be solved by backward induction, computing the value functions V C i , V S i for i = N, N − 1, . . . , 2, 1. The terminal conditions imply that at the final time t = t N one has
Assume that the value functions V C i+1 , V S i+1 are known. At time t i , let the "sell" and "buy" portions of the LOB have sizes (x i , y i ). To compute V C i (x i , y i ) we proceed as follows. First, assume that at time t i a buying order arrives, of random size X i . The portion X i = min{X i , x i } of this order will be executed. The expected payoffs, for an agent holding a unit of stock or a unit of cash at time t i+1 , are thus computed as
Next, assume that at time t i a sell order arrives, of random size Y i . The portion Y i = min{Y i , y i } of this order will be executed. The expected payoffs, for an agent holding a unit of stock or a unit of cash at time t i+1 , are then computed as
5 Dynamic evolution of the LOB Assume that the values of a unit of cash V C = V C i+1 (ξ, η) and the value of a unit of stock V S = V S i+1 (ξ, η) at time t = t i+1 are known, depending on the sizes (ξ, η) of the two parts of the LOB at time t i+1 . Moreover, let x, y be the sizes of the "sell" and "buy" portions of the LOB at time t i . We wish to find the shape of the LOB at time t i .
5.1
The "sell" portion of the LOB.
As in (2.9), let the random variable X describe the size of the incoming "buy" order. Moreover, let U (p) be the amount of stock offered for sale at price ≤ p, as in (2.11) . Then the expected payoff by putting a unit of stock on sale at price p is
Notice that in the case where V C ≡ α and V S ≡ β are constant, the quantity in (5.1) reduces to p Ψ(U (p)) · α + (1 − Ψ(U (p)) · β .
Assuming that the LOB is a Nash equilibrium, we deduce that the quantity in (5.1) is constant on the support of U (i.e., it is constant on the set of all prices at which some stock is actually offered for sale). Differentiating the right hand side of (5.1) w.r.t. p, one obtains
Notice again that, in the case where V C ≡ α and V S ≡ β, the above equation reduces to Ψ(U (p)) + U (p)Ψ (U (p)) p − β α = 0, which yields (2.14), with p 0 = β/α.
We regard (5.2) as an ODE for the function U (p), where the right hand side depends on p, x, y and on the functions V C , V S . This must be solved with boundary condition
5.2
The "buy" portion of the LOB.
As in (2.20), let Y be the random size of the incoming "sell"order. Moreover, let U (p) be the total amount of stock that agents bid to buy at price ≥ p, as in (2.21). Then the expected payoff for an agent who offers to buy a unit of stock at price p is
Assuming that the LOB is a Nash equilibrium, we deduce that the quantity in (5.4) is constant on the support of U (i.e., it is constant on the set of all prices at which some agent is bidding to buy the stock). Differentiating the right hand side of (5.4) w.r.t. p, one obtains
In the special case where V C ≡ α and V S ≡ β, the above equation reduces to
which yields (2.24), with p 0 = β/α.
We regard (5.5) as an ODE for the function U (p), where the right hand side depends on p, x, y, and on the functions V C , V S . This must be solved with boundary condition
Existence of the two-sided LOB.
Let the mean bid-ask price p be given.
• By solving the Cauchy problem (5.2)-(5.3), we obtain the function U (p) = amount of stock which agents offer for sale at price ≤ p. Given the total amount x of stock offered for sale, the minimum ask price is then determined by the implicit equation
• By solving the Cauchy problem (5.5)-(5.6), we obtain the function U (p) = amount of stock which agents offer to buy at price ≥ p. Given the total amount y of stock which agents bid to buy, the maximum bid price is then determined by the implicit equation
To establish the existence and uniqueness of the two-sided LOB, we need to show that, under suitable assumptions, the map
is a strict contraction, hence it has a unique fixed point. As in the proof of Theorem 1, the heart of the matter is to estimate the partial derivatives ∂p A /∂p and ∂p B /∂p.
To fix the ideas, assume we have a priori bounds
for all ξ ≥ 0, η ≥ 0. In connection with (5.2), these imply
) .
(5.11) Notice that the right hand side of (5.11) approaches +∞ as p decreases to V S min /V C max .
Introduce the functions
Then the equation in (5.11) can be written as
. Inverting the role of the two variables, we obtain the linear ODE dp The linear Cauchy problem (5.13)-(5.14) can be explicitly solved. Indeed 15) for some constant C 0 . The boundary condition (5.14) yields
Since p A = p(0), we study the value of p at U = 0. Using the priori bounds (5.10) and recalling that ln Ψ(0) = 0, from (5.16) we obtain
A similar analysis applies to the "buy" portion of the LOB. Indeed, (5.5) implies
(5.18) Notice that the right hand side of (5.12) approaches +∞ as p decreases to V S min /V C max .
Introducing the functions
the ODE in (5.18) can be written as
. (5.19) Inverting the role of the two variables p and U , we obtain a Bernoulli differential equation
with terminal data at U = y given by
Introducing the new variable q = 1/p, we obtain the linear Cauchy problem
An explicit computation yields 
Since p B = p(0) ≤ p, using the a priori bounds (5.10) one obtains
Combining the two inequalities (5.17) and (5.24), we obtain a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique mean bid-ask price p.
Theorem 3. Assume that the value functions V C , V S satisfy the a priori bounds (5.10). Moreover, assume that the total amount x of stock offered for sale and the total amount y that agents bid to buy are both large enough, so that
Then the two-sided LOB has a unique equilibrium configuration.
Proof. Combining (5.17) and (5.24) with the assumption (5.25) one obtains d dp
showing that the map p → 1 2 (p A + p B ) is a strict contraction. Hence, a unique fixed point exists.
As soon as this unique mean bid-ask price p has been determined, the "sell" and the "buy" portions of the LOB are obtained by solving the Cauchy problems (5.2)-(5.3) and (5.5)-(5.6), respectively. Remark 3. In the above setting, Ψ(x) is the probability that the external buy order is so large that it wipes out the entire "sell" portion of the LOB. Similarly, Φ(y) is the probability that the external sell order is so large that it wipes out the entire "buy" portion of the LOB.
The key assumption of the theorem requires that these probabilities are sufficiently small. Notice that, if V C (ξ, η) and V S (ξ, η) are constants, then λ C = λ S = 1 and the assumption (5.25) is exactly the same as (2.30) in Theorem 1.
The inductive computation of the value functions.
If the existence of a unique fixed point p is known, the value functions V C , V S can then be inductively computed as follows. Let P buy = P be the probability that the external agent is a buyer, so that P sell = (1 − P ) is the probability that the external agent is a seller.
The assumption that the LOB represents an equilibrium implies that the expected payoff for an agent holding a unit amount of stock (or a unit amount of cash) is independent of the price p he asks (or the price he bids). In particular, we can compute this payoff in the case p = p A (or p = p B , respectively), where the transaction occurs with probability one.
We thus obtain the inductive relations In order to apply Theorem 3, and construct the value functions V C i , V S i for all i = 1, . . . , N by backward induction, we need to provide suitable upper and lower bounds. The proof will be achieved by backward induction. Assuming that V C i+1 , V S i+1 satisfy the bounds
we will show that V C i , V S i satisfy the inequalities (5.30)-(5.31).
1. Using the functions F , g C , g S and G,g C ,g S , by (5.2) and (5.5) we have 0 = F (U (p)) + U (p)Ψ (U (p)) · p · g C (U (p)) − g S (U (p)) and 0 = − 1 p 2 G(U (p)) − U (p)Φ (U (p)) · g C (U (p)) − 1 pg S (U (p)) .
It follows that
p · g C (U (p)) − g S (U (p)) ≥ 0 , for all p ∈ [p A , (1 + δ 1 )p] andg C (U (p)) − 1 pg S (U (p)) ≤ 0 , for all p ∈ [(1 − δ 2 )p, p B ] .
In particular,
(1 + δ 1 )p · g C (x) ≥ g S (x) andg C (y) ≤ 1 (1 − δ 2 )p ·g S (y) . 
(5.37) Therefore, we obtain p A ≥β V C i+1 .
Concerning the maximum bid price p B , from (5.23), (5.32) and (5.36), it follows
(5.38) Therefore, we have p B ≤ V S i+1 . It follows
Analogously, we obtain
. By (5.34)-(5.35), for any x, y it follows
(5.40)
